Abstract
Legal positivism in the jurisprudential tradition of the European Continent is characterised by what might be called the facticity thesis: the law is ultimately explicable in terms of, or ‘reducible to,’ a concatenation of fact – whether it be power, the will of the sovereign, or the community’s acceptance of the legal system Kelsen’s conviction that the facticity thesis is wrongheaded drives his theory, particularly in the very early work. In place of the legal positivist’s facticity thesis, Kelsen introduces a normativity thesis, which calls for an explication of law – and of legal obligation in particular – altogether independently of fact.
CONTINUE READING FULL ARTICLE| Published | November 1996 |
|---|---|
| Frequency | Bi-Monthly |
| Volume | 59 |
| Issue | 6 |
| Print ISSN | 0026-7961 |
| Online ISSN | 1468-2230 |
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