Ways of Explaining Law
Some years ago, Ian Ayres was asked to participate in a symposium on the comparative merits of the methods of economics and sociology in relation to law. Discussions of methodology, he said, do not get a lot of attention, and rightly so: the proof should be in the pudding.1 By this measure, general jurisprudence is in trouble, because the impression ones gets is that the only topic that gets more attention than debates on methodology is laments over a subject that lost its way.2
Julie Dickson's new book Elucidating Law can be read as an attempt to respond to the naysayers.3 The book aims to lay the methodological foundations for legal philosophy, what Dickson calls ‘the philosophy of legal philosophy’ (1), as well as to report on a thriving discipline in which many different questions are pursued from a wide range of perspectives. More concretely, Dickson seeks to vindicate and explain the significance of the search for what she calls ‘the character of law’ while remaining sympathetic to the value of other questions or approaches to the study of law. Dickson does this by advancing two central claims: She embraces a form of disciplinary pluralism, which recognises that different approaches and perspectives contribute to a richer overall understanding of law. At the same time, she also defends what she calls a ‘staged inquiry’ (83, 102), a view that insists on the primacy of identifying law's necessary features – of what something ‘must be’ in order to count as law – before turning to its normative evaluation. It is the search for law's nature or character that gives legal philosophy its distinct role.
Dan Priel