Abstract
John Stuart Mill defended the law’s refusal to enforce self-enslavement contracts on the ground that the ‘principle of freedom cannot require that he [the would-be slave] be free not to be free.’ Mill’s statement has received much attention over the years, but little support. Critics argue that Mill’s position is paternalistic, if not actually incoherent, and that the legal bar on contracts of self-enslavement can be explained more easily on the basis of a concern for procedural and/or substantive unfairness. In this article, I defend Mill’s statement. I shall argue that a concern for ‘future freedom’ justifies not only the courts’ approach to self-enslavement contracts, but also the courts’ scrutiny of a number of other (as I shall call them ‘autonomy-endangering agreement’.
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