Abstract
A member of a professional body is disciplined by that body and her licence to practice taken away. A firm is refused membership of an exchange or trading body on a ground not contained in the body’s rules. A person complains that the rules of a sporting association are discriminatory. Each seeks to challenge the associations’ decisions in the court. In the absence of legislation, how should the court respond? Various pre-occupations obscure the main issue: what should be the response of law when faced with what are in effect mini-systems of collective government? It is a question of how to constitutionalise self-regulation. The aim of this article is to begin to answer this question; to understand the constitutional issues raised by SRAs and the ways in which these are and could be addressed. The aim is not to reach the ultimate stage, a new theory for judicial review of self-regulatory associations, but to explore how we may begin that process and to offer a way forward which draws on some of the insights of reflexive law.
CONTINUE READING FULL ARTICLE| Published | January 1996 |
|---|---|
| Frequency | Bi-Monthly |
| Volume | 59 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Print ISSN | 0026-7961 |
| Online ISSN | 1468-2230 |
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