Abstract
Review of Bernard Robertson and G.A. Vignaux, Interpreting Evidence: Evaluating Forensic Science in the Courtroom, Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 1995, xxi + 240 pp, hb £24.95.
Bayes’ theorem was used by Finkelstein and Fairley to show how probabilistic evidence could be combined with a fact-finder’s (subjective) evaluation of the prior probability of a defendant’s guilt. The authors proposed the explicit use of Bayesian methods in court and recommended that jurors be asked to quantify their prior probabilities in the interests of rational decision-making. Following on from Finkelstein and Fairley’s lead, other commentators have suggested that probability theory may help courts to make more rational, accurate decisions.’ Robertson and Vignaux’s work shares this perspective. Elsewhere they have argued that the conventional rules of probability provide the only rational way to analyse evidence and that legal rules which depart from the axioms of probability are wrong.’ They describe Interpreting Evidence as part of their wider project of logical analysis of evidential issues.
CONTINUE READING FULL ARTICLE| Published | September 1996 |
|---|---|
| Frequency | Bi-Monthly |
| Volume | 59 |
| Issue | 5 |
| Print ISSN | 0026-7961 |
| Online ISSN | 1468-2230 |
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