Abstract
Courts, no doubt, can get moral answers wrong, but can they also get morality itself wrong? This is the ambitious question asked by Bosko Tripkovic in The Metaethics of Constitutional Adjudication. This book aims to elucidate the use of ethical or moral arguments in constitutional reasoning by searching for their metaethical foundations. The book’s approach is original and thought-provoking. Tripkovic succeeds in demonstrating that metaethics does matter. As I aim to show in this review, however, MeCA’s categorisation of ethical argument at times seems crudely reductive, deploying an unrealistic benchmark of ‘timeless and mind-independent moral facts’. MeCA’s own metaethical theory is not entirely convincing, as it is so infused with normative reasoning that it fails to ‘climb outside of morality’.
CONTINUE READING FULL ARTICLE| Published | November 2019 |
|---|---|
| Frequency | Bi-Monthly |
| Volume | 82 |
| Issue | 6 |
| Print ISSN | 0026-7961 |
| Online ISSN | 1468-2230 |
Previous Review Issues
Select a previous issue of the Modern Law Review