Abstract
‘From the Progressive Era forward, the rhetoric of the social and psychological causes of crime have vied – in the law, in the media, in ourselves – with the rhetoric of, and ineradicable belief in, human freedom. This ceaseless battle is only partly contained by our explanations to ourselves and others for the consciousness of freedom or by the view that, although determining factors exist, they are either compatible with moral and legal responsibility or are typically not all-encompassing: that we – and those whom we blame – have the wherewithal to resist, even if we often lack the ability to draw the line between the resistible and the irresistible with certainty.’ (479-480).
So Thomas Andrew Green summarises the main preoccupation of this extended and meticulous meditation on the history of legal academic thought about criminal responsibility in the United States. Focusing on the ‘long twentieth century’ from the rise of the Progressive Era to the triumph of neo-retributivism, Green structures his intellectual history in three main parts or, as he puts it, essays: the ‘age of Pound’, stretching from the early reception of scientific ideas into debates about responsibility in the late nineteenth century through to the work of scholars such as Sheldon Glueck and John Henry Wigmore in the 1920s; a ‘forgotten’ period from the 1930s to the 1960s gradually marked by utilitarian thinking, alongside a resurgence of appeals to conventional morality as a necessary component of responsibility-attribution; and the last decades of the twentieth century, which saw a revival of retributivist thinking, much of it framed within broadly compatibilist philosophy.
CONTINUE READING FULL ARTICLE| Published | November 2016 |
|---|---|
| Frequency | Bi-monthly |
| Volume | 79 |
| Issue | 6 |
| Print ISSN | 0026-7961 |
| Online ISSN | 1468-2230 |
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