Abstract
Lawyers and judges often use history in constitutional adjudication to provide context for constitutional interpretation. But there is debate about the extent to which historiography – the critical study of how history is written, developed by professional historians – is relevant to constitutional adjudication. This article argues that historiography has little relevance to constitutional reasoning grounded on historic legal sources such as court cases or legislation. But when constitutional reasoning relies on non-legal, general historical sources, historiography provides important insights. Arguments based on general historical sources – particularly originalist ones – can and should be critiqued on historiographical grounds. These methods show that general historical sources are unlikely to generate precise and objective constitutional meaning but can be used to develop and constrain many constitutional arguments, including those concerning constitutional practice, purpose, or values. Historiographic methods are important for lawyers and judges seeking to critique or make constitutional arguments grounded on general history.
CONTINUE READING FULL ARTICLE| Published | May 2023 |
|---|---|
| Frequency | Bi-Monthly |
| Volume | 86 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Print ISSN | 0026-7961 |
| Online ISSN | 1468-2230 |
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