Abstract
Does subjectivity play a role in common law decision-making? If it does, is that something that lowers the quality of those judgments and puts in question the whole institution of adjudication? Douglas Edlin’s new book answers ‘yes’ to the first question and ‘no’ to the second. In doing so, it draws an analogy between judging law and judging art – or more precisely, between a Kantian account of aesthetic judgement and the process of common law judgment. In addition, it is said, making room for these two answers will help move theories of legal reasoning beyond the misleading opposition between strong objectivism and mere subjectivism. As Edlin puts it, ‘The problem is not that there is a subjective element to judging. The problem is that we think this is a problem’. Edlin’s book, then, offers both a diagnosis and a treatment for this malady of theory.
CONTINUE READING FULL ARTICLE| Published | May 2017 |
|---|---|
| Frequency | Bi-Monthly |
| Volume | 80 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Print ISSN | 0026-7961 |
| Online ISSN | 1468-2230 |
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