Abstract
Economists sometimes say, tongue in cheek, that when you walk down the street, you are forcing other people to take out an insurance policy with you. The truth in this is that any system that holds you personally liable for the accidents you cause entails that the only way in which the victims can avoid having to pay for the resulting harm is to sue you. Absent insurance, their only
insurance is you. What lends the truth its levity is that it is strange to describe you as your victim’s insurer. For a start, it is people who choose insurers, not vice versa. And insurers do not cause the harms they compensate. Their liability is derivative rather than original: they pay for what someone else has done and is responsible for. The reason why you are not your victim’s insurer is that when you are liable for the harm you have caused them, your liability is original. You pay for what you have done. This, in turn, suggests that the conditions of your original liability are basically independent of insurance considerations. Figuring out whether you are liable for the accident you caused is one thing, finding out whether and when you may ‘lift’ or ‘shift’ the burden of liability to an insurer is another. Most ‘classical’ accounts of the law of obligations think like this. Many of their advocates probably find the joke mildly funny.
Rob Merkin and Jenny Steele like the joke too. They agree that it would be misleading to think of contract and tort law as some kind of large insurance system. But they reject the view that insurance is unrelated to the duties that contract and tort law impose on a person. In their view ‘insurance operates not at the periphery, but at the core of the law of obligations, in both practical and conceptual terms’ (3). At the same time, they believe that this operation does not conform to a single idea or formula. In their view, insurance can play a different role in different contexts: sometimes it helps to determine who is liable for a loss; sometimes it settles questions about the rights of third parties; sometimes it affects the shape of litigation, and so on. This qualfication gives Merkin and Steele’s overall account a somewhat pointillist feel. The main message of Insurance and the Law of Obligations, namely that private lawyers cannot do their job well unless they think hard about insurance, is based not on some grand theoretical claim about the connection between insurance and the aims of the law of obligations, but on a patient discussion of various contexts in which considerations of insurance affect the duties or burdens that contract and tort law impose on people.
CONTINUE READING FULL ARTICLE| Published | May 2016 |
|---|---|
| Frequency | Bi-Monthly |
| Volume | 79 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Print ISSN | 0026-7961 |
| Online ISSN | 1468-2230 |
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