Abstract
This article challenges the pervasive assumption that judicial review of administrative action is not concerned with rights. Making a break from this orthodoxy, it proposes a theory of judicial review that suggests that its purpose is to protect distinctive administrative law rights held by those subject to public administrative power. This rights-based theory makes sense of the structure of applications for judicial review in which, paradigmatically, an individual subject to an administrative decision makes a claim against the state that the public official responsible for that decision failed to meet the relevant administrative law standards, and accordingly demands a remedy. The bulk of the article is dedicated to addressing the major objections to a rights-based theory, including those arising from public interest standing and the nature of judicial review remedies. The analysis shows that each of these objections fails, clearing the ground for a fuller development of a rights-based theory of judicial review in future work.
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