review article

Liberalism and the Reason of Law

Alexander Somek

Abstract

There are a number of straightforward ways to establish connections between modern law and liberalism; indeed, it is so facile that one is inclined to regard the requisite links as intrinsic. Whatever end a liberal society is supposed to serve primarily, it uses parliaments and courts of law in order to erect bulwarks against state interference and to make sure that the rule of law is observed so that people can stand a fair chance to conduct their life in anticipation of how the state may react to their conduct. Curiously, none of these themes play a role in Johan van der Walt’s The Concept of Liberal Democratic Law, a book that claims to present not merely the concept of law, but, indeed, the liberal concept of law. The first parts of the following essay take a closer look at how the author develops this concept. It will be seen that it is entwined with a deflation of reason into a means to evoke attitudes. The concept of liberal democratic law defended by the author therefore comes perilously close to embracing some form of irrationalism. But this does not mean that the work lacks any merit. The second part engages with some of the author’s amazing and powerful ideas. It attempts, however, to place them in a different context. It emphasises the relational nature of law and seeks to explain that constitutional authority has now taken the place of natural law. The concluding observations concern the historicity of the reasonableness that the law claims to embody.

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Published March 2021
Frequency Bi-Monthly
Volume 84
Issue 2
Print ISSN 0026-7961
Online ISSN 1468-2230