Abstract
Free speech theory has been entwined with theories of democracy since at least the mid-20th century. Ronald Dworkin spells out the link between democracy and free speech in terms of state legitimacy. The state’s enforcement of the law ‘downstream’, he argues, is only democratically legitimate if it allows unfettered debate ‘upstream’ over the ideals being enforced. In Hate Speech and Democratic Citizenship, Eric Heinze defends a novel version of this kind of view, arguing that the freedom to express our views – including views that would qualify as hate speech – must be ‘safeguarded not only as an individual right, but as an essential attribute of democratic citizenship’(4) After presenting a synopsis of Heinze’s view in the next section, we explore three main lines of criticism against it. In the third section we explain how Heinze partitions the concept of legitimacy in order to isolate a notion of democratic legitimacy, and we argue that this unduly emphasises free public discourse as the defining feature of a democracy. In part four we raise some concerns with Heinze’s reliance on the idea that the demands of democracy are hypothetically binding rather than categorically binding. While Heinze needs to say that democratic requirements are a merely hypothetical imperative, we show that this is a hard case to make. We also suggest some problems with Heinze’s historical inductive argument. In the fifth part we suggest that, given Heinze’s view of democratic legitimacy, an long stable prosperous democracy that is responding to hate speech’s targets must say that upholding democracy matters more than relieving these people’s suffering. We raise some concerns about an understanding of democracy that has this implication.
CONTINUE READING FULL ARTICLE| Published | July 2017 |
|---|---|
| Frequency | Bi-Monthly |
| Volume | 80 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Print ISSN | 0026-7961 |
| Online ISSN | 1468-2230 |
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